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CHARACTER EVIDENCE-THE RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY
IN CRIMINAL CASES IN KENTUCKY
INTRODUCTION
To pull one misshapen stone out of the grotesque structure is more
likely simply to upset its present balance between adverse in-
terests than to establish a rational edifice.'
As indicated by the Supreme Court in Michelson v. United States,2
the source of the above quotation, the rules governing the admissibility
of character evidence have long been confusing and troublesome. In
view of the courts' difficulty with the proper uses of character evidence,
there can be little doubt that juries have been even more perplexed
when faced with the problem of assigning weight and according
proper significance to such evidence. The purpose of this note is to
review and analyze the rules governing the use of character evidence
in criminal cases in Kentucky. Where the law is in need of revision,
possible alternatives will be recommended.
I. CEiACiTR AND REPUTATION
Although "character" and "reputation" have sometimes been used
interchangeably in court decisions, they are entirely different concepts.
Reputation is merely a method for establishing character,3 and may, in
some instances, be unreliable since one having a good reputation may
in fact lack good character.
Character is defined as one's disposition to act in a particular
manner.4 It is a trait or the sum total of traits, that one possesses.5
"It is evidence of a condition or characteristic from which the jury
may presume or deduce a fact."6 Reputation, on the other hand, may
be viewed as the community's conception of a person's character. Ac-
cordingly, the Court of Appeals in Shell v. Commonwealth defined
reputation as "the cumulative effect on the community's mind of a
group, or the sum total of one's traits of character." Testimony con-
cerning one's reputation is hearsay, but is admissible as an exception
to the hearsay rule because it is believed to satisfy the dual require-
' Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948). The Court concluded
that character evidence is "archaic" and "paradoxical" but somehow "workable
even if clumsy."
2Id.
3 1 J. WiirxE, EVmENCE § 52 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WGMORE].
4 1 WIMORE, supra note 3, § 52. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 304 (1942)
defines character as the "aggregate of a person s traits."
Shell v. Commonwealth, 53 S.W.2d 524 (Ky. 1932).
6 Id. at 525.
7 53 S.W.2d 524 (Ky. 1932).
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ments of trustworthiness and necessity.8 Reputation is distinguished
from mere rumor by the fact that reputation embodies the consensus
of the community9 while rumor is a mere report that has not received
general credibility.10
II. Tm MEANs OF PRovING CHAntAc=a
In Kentucky, character evidence is generally limited to testimony
concerning the person's reputation in the community in which he is
known. 1 Although opinion evidence was once accepted as proof of
character, it is now widely rejected, but the rationale for its rejection
has been characterized by Professor Wigmore as unsound.
12 Sig-
nificantly, the Proposed Rules of Evidence for United States Courts
and Magistrates [hereinafter cited as Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence] provide that opinion evidence is admissible to prove char-
acter.13 If approved by Congress, these rules will probably be adopted
by many states as were the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus,
the admissibility of opinion evidence to prove character may be re-
vived. Permitting.proof of character by both reputation and opinion
evidence may be a marked improvement over proof of character by
reputation alone. In the view of one commentator, "[t]he personal
judgment of a qualified and reliable witness ought to be better than
reputation of character based upon the hearsay interchange of gossip
of scandal in the community."
14
Consistent with the great majority of jurisdictions, 15 Kentucky
prohibits the admission of evidence of particular acts to prove char-
acter.'8 Particular acts are inadmissible to prove character, not be-
cause they are irrelevant, but rather because they may be "too con-
vincing" and cause undue prejudice. Such evidence is also objection-
able because it tends to waste time, cause unfair surprise, and confuse
the issues.' 7 One can recognize the plight of a juror, if a criminal
8 5 WIGMOnE, supra note 3, § 1610.
9 As will be discussed infra, "community" may now be an outmoded concept
in the context in which it has been used.
10 5 WIGMOHE, supra note 3 § 1611.
13 Borders v. Commonwealt, 67 S.W.2d 960 (Ky. 1935). Reputation testi-
mony is admissible to prove character under MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 305
(1942), and under UNiFoRm RULEs OF EVmENcE rule 46 (1953).
12 7 WiGMoHE, supra note 3, § 1986.
1 3 PROPOsED RUiLEs OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES CouRrs AND
MAGISTRATES rule 405 (Revised Draft 1971) [hereinafter cited as PnoPosED
FEDmA RuLzs OF EVIDENCE].
14 Ladd, Techniques and Theory of Character Testimony, 24 IowA. L. REv.
498, 511 (1939).
15 1 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 193.
16 White v. Commonwealth, 4 Ky. L. Rptr. 373 (1882).
17 1 WIGMoRE, supra note 3, § 193.
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defendant were permitted to prove his good character by showing
numerous benevolent acts and the prosecution were in turn permitted
to introduce in rebuttal a like number of malevolent acts.
Ill. CHA3AcrER To PRovE AN Acr
It is generally agreed that character evidence is relevant to show
one's disposition to commit a particular act. However, the law is well
settled that in a criminal trial the prosecution is prohibited from
initially introducing evidence of the defendant's character to prove
that the defendant probably committed the act for which he is charged.
In Calhoun v. Commonwealth,18 it was held reversible error for the
prosecution to introduce evidence of the accused's bad character when
the defendant had not offered evidence of his good character. This
exclusionary rule is based on the rationale that a jury may tend to
convict the accused because he is a bad man rather than because of
the persuasiveness of the evidence against him. One of the few studies
of the jury system disclosed that the percentage of convictions in-
creased when evidence of the defendant's bad character or prior
wrongful acts was introduced.19 The rule of exclusion is therefore
based on the policy of preventing undue prejudice.20 However, when
an accused takes the stand to testify, his character for truth and
veracity is placed in issue, and he is subject to impeachment the same
as any other witness.
Although the prosecution is prohibited from initially introducing
proof of the defendant's character to prove his propensity to commit
an offense, a defendant is permitted to introduce evidence of a relevant
character trait to infer that it is improbable that he committed an act
inconsistent and alien to his disposition.21 This rule is said to have
originated as an outgrowth of the English sporting concept of fair
play.22
An accused who offers proof of his character must limit it to
traits which are relevant to the offense charged.2 3 In an assault case,
character for peace and quiet is a relevant trait.2 4 Where the charge
involves a sex offense, generally the accused's character for chastity
and morality is admissible.25 If the charge is a theft related offense,
18 64 S.W. 965 (Ky. 1901). Accord, Combs v. Commonwealth, 169 S.W. 879
(Ky. 1914); Newman v. Commonwealth, 88 S.W. 1091 (Ky. 1905).
19 H. KAL EN & J. ZEISEL, THE AmEuCAN JuRy 160 (1966).
20 1 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 194.
21 Shell v. Commonwealth, 53 S.W.2d 524 (Ky. 1932).
22 1 WIGMOaE, supra note 3, § 57.
2 3 Stacy v. Commonwealth, 225 S.W. 37 (Ky. 1920).24 Pickelseimer v. Commonwealth, 290 S.W. 498 (Ky. 1927).25 Cox v. Commonwealth, 162 S.W.2d 201 (Ky. 1942).
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honesty is the relevant trait.26 And if the issue is credibility, only the
witness's character for truth and veracity is admissible.27 Contrary to
the majority view, Kentucky adheres to the rule that evidence of good
moral character is admissible where the defendant is charged with any
felony offense.28 The rationale for this rule has been explained as
follows:
Any felony charge is a stigma, and puts the general moral character
in issue. An unblemished character is inconsistent with the com-
mission of crime, and, when indicted for a felony, no good reason
can be perceived why the person enjoying such character should
not be entitled to prove it as well as that of the particular trait
involved.2
9
Thus, it is recognized that general moral character is relevant to a
person's disposition to act criminally irrespective of the particular
nature of the offense.
Once the accused has introduced evidence of his good character
for a particular trait, the prosecution is allowed to offer proof of bad
character in rebuttal but is limited to that trait which the defense
presented on direct examination.30 The accused rarely profits from
introducing evidence of his character where the prosecution has any
basis for rebuttal, and, as will be discussed in detail below, the de-
fendant who introduces a character witness is always subject to the
potentially dangerous effects of having his character witness asked on
cross-examination whether he has heard of particular wrongful acts
committed by the accused. Although the purpose of these questions
is to test the credibility of the character witness, the fact that the
question is asked creates an inherently unfavorable inference.
IV. REPUTATION TESTIMONY iN KENTUcKY
A. Proof of Character by Reputation Testimony
Kentucky does not permit the introduction of evidence of particular
acts l' or opinion32 to prove character. In Cox v. Commonwealth,
33
26 0augh v. Commonwealth, 87 S.W.2d 94 (Ky. 1935).
27 Ashcraft v. Commonwealth, 5 S.W.2d 1067 (Ky. 1928).
28 Pickelseimer v. Commonwealth, 290 S.W. 498 (Ky. 1927). In Pickelseimer,
the Court failed to follow the rule, recognized in McCandless v. Commonwealth,
185 S.W. 1100 (Ky. 1916), that in a homicide case character evidence is limited to
the accused's reputation for peace and quiet. Cf. Demaree v. Commonwealth,
82 S.W. 231 (Ky. 1904) (improper for the accused to prove his character for being
gentle and kind).2 9 Pickelseimer v. Commonwealth, 290 S.W. 498, 499 (Ky. 1927).
30 Strong v. Commonwealth, 287 S.W. 235 (Ky. 1926).
81Oesv. Commonwealth, 222 S.W. 524 (Ky. 1920).
32 Borders v. Commonwealth, 67 S.W.2d 960 (Ky. 1934).
33 162 S.W.2d 201 (Ky. 1942).
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the defendant attempted to prove his good character by testifying
that he had never committed acts of a particular nature. In referring
to this method of proving character, the Court of Appeals stated that
the defense, like the prosecution, is not permitted to prove character
by the use of particular acts.
As in most jurisdictions, proof of character in Kentucky is, with few
exceptions, limited to reputation testimony. Reputation testimony
may often be opinion evidence in disguise; however, in theory, opinion
and reputation are two distinct types of evidence. The distinction
between them, as expressed in Citizens Bank of Morehead v. Hunt,
4
is that while opinion is what a person thinks of another, reputation "is
the estimate in which he is held by the people generally with whom
he associates and is in contact with in everyday life."
5
A penetrating cross-examination of a character witness who has
testified to the reputation of an accused often elicits the fact that the
testimony is based on the witness's opinion or on paricular acts which
have come to his attention.3" Where it can be shown that a character
witness's testimony is based not on his knowledge of the person's
reputation but on evidence of an inadmissible type, the Court should,
on proper motion, admonish the jury to disregard the testimony.
Where the testimony is deemed so prejudicial as to result in a miscar-
riage of justice, the jury should be dismissed.3r
A character witness is customarily asked whether he knows the
reputation of the accused for a particular trait. Originally it was
required that the witness be asked whether he knew the person's
reputation in the community in which he resides, the requirement
having originated at a time when people resided in rural and small
town settings. In today's mobile, urbanized society it is more difficult
for a person to have an established reputation in the community of his
residence; therefore, in many instances the community requirement no
longer has relevance .3 This was recognized in Wilson v. Common-
wealth,3 9 where the Court pointed out that community has no geo-
34 154 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1941).
35 Id. at 731. See also Davenport v. Commonwealth, 148 S.W.2d 1054 (Ky.
1941k Citizens Bank of Morehead v. Hunt, 154 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1941). There,
it was brought out on cross examination that a witness who purported to be
testifying to the defendant's reputation was in fact testifying to his opinion of the
defendant based on the defendants failure to tell the truth and pay a promissory
note.
37 Borders v. Commonwealth, 67 S.W.2d 960 (Ky. 1934).
38 Ladd, Techniques and Theory of Character Testimony, supra note 14. The
author points out that since the larger the city the more scattered the sources of
comment, reputation testimony is less reliable.
89 475 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1971).
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graphical definition and should thus be defined as the area where the
person is well known and has established a reputation. Therefore, it
would be more proper in some cases to permit testimony of a person's
reputation at his place of employment than to require testimony of his
reputation in the community where he resides.
A witness is permitted to testify to a person's good character even
though he has not heard it discussed by those in the area where the
person is known.40 In Davenport v. Commonwealth,41 the trial court
excluded testimony of the defendant's character witness because the
witness had not heard the defendant's character discussed, since there
had been no occasion for it. On appeal, the Court held that it was
prejudicial error to exclude such testimony where it is shown that the
character witness was in a position to have heard derogatory state-
ments concerning the person about whom he is testifying. The Court
explained that the witness is competent to testify if he knows the
accused and the people in the community where he resides. This
rule is based on the assumption that it is human nature to comment
on one's demonstrated character flaws, whereas good character is
rarely the subject of comment. This type of testimony is thus often
called "negative character" evidence.
Since a person's character for violence, immorality, dishonesty, or
untruthfulness is more apt to be the subject of comment than one's
virtues, proof of bad character is admissible only if it is shown by
positive testimony that his neighbors and acquaintances have spoken
of his bad character.42 An unsavory reputation as to a particular trait
of character may sometimes be shown to have originated only after a
criminal charge has been placed against the individual. If so, it
should be excluded. In Allen v. Commonwealth,43 the defendant in a
homicide case, after introducing evidence of her reputation for peace
and quietude, was confronted with rebuttal testimony. On cross-
examination, the defense established that the rebuttal witness's testi-
mony was based on the reputation of the defendant which resulted
from the defendant's having had a criminal charge placed against her.
The Court of Appeals held that such evidence should be excluded.
B. Criticisms of Reputation Testimony
Too often it is forgotten that character rather than reputation is
the primary subject of the inquiry. Reputation is merely an indirect
40 Shephard v. Commonwealth, 327 S.W.2d 956 (Ky. 1959).41 148 S.W.2d 1054 (Ky. 1941).
42 Id.
43 119 S.W. 795 (Ky. 1909).
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method of establishing character, but, because of the problems in-
herent in its use, the purpose of the inquiry is sometimes obscured.
One of the basic reasons for preferring reputation testimony over
opinion evidence is that it is thought to be trustworthy because it
represents the consensus of the community. However, the validity of
such reasoning is questionable.44 Gossip often grows worse as it
spreads. Although the facts may be utterly without foundation, they
are often accepted as true when passed from person to person. Further,
community standards vary and affect the objectivity of one's reputa-
tion, but the community cannot be cross-examined. Admitting opinion
evidence to prove character could be a better method. The judgment
of a witness who has had sufficient opportunity to observe the person
in question may be more indicative of his character than the testimony
of hearsay multiplied many times.45
V. SPEaCAL UsEs oF CHAIcra EviDEN E
A. The Character of the Victim in Assault Cases
When a defendant in a criminal case interposes the plea of self-
defense as justification for the act committed, character evidence is
admissible for two distinct purposes. First, if the issue is whether the
accused or the victim was the aggressor, evidence of the victim's char-
acter for violence is admissible to show his disposition to act in con-
formity therewith on the occasion in question.46 In this situation, it is
irrelevant that the defendant was unaware of the victim's reputation
for violence at the time of the act. The evidence is directed solely
to the identification of the aggressor and is not offered to infer that the
act was justified because the victim was a violent and vile person. The
only trait of character of the victim which is admissible is that of
violence or, in rebuttal, peace and quietude; proof of the victim's
character for a trait not indicating a disposition to engage in violent
acts is irrelevant.47
44Ladd, Techniques and Theory of Character Testimony, supra note 14. Pro-
fessor Ladd concludes:
Good living consistently pursued is recognized, and marked departures
from approved conduct become known and are the subject of comment
On this theory, the law, with few signs of change, accepts reputation as
evidence of character. But whether character testimony in the average
case is worthwhile at all is a real question, and whether reputation to
prove character is satisfactory is even more doubtful.
Id. at 517.
45 Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 166, 173-74
(1940).4 6 Payne v. Commonwealth, 58 Ky. (1 Met.) 370 (1858).
4 7 See Benge v. Commonwealth, 97 S.W.2d 54 (Ky. 1936), where the
(Continued on next page)
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If the accused was the aggressor, the victim's character is im-
material. 48 Hence the prosecution is not permitted to initially intro-
duce evidence of the victim's character.49 Further, the prosecution is
not permitted to introduce proof of the defendant's character merely
because the defendant has offered proof of the victim's character.50
The second purpose for which proof of the victim's character for
violence is admissible is to establish an element of the defendant's plea
of self-defense, i.e., that he had reasonable grounds to believe at the
time of his act that he was in imminent danger of death or great
bodily harm. Since the apprehension of the one attacked is crucial,
the defendant must have known of the deceased's character for
violence at the time he committed the act.5l The rationale for admitting
character evidence in this situation was well expressed in Conley v.
Commonwealth:5 2 "One would naturally act quicker and on less
provocation in the face of a threatening attitude on the part of a
dangerous and bad character than on that of a man who had the
reputation of being peaceable and law-abiding. . . ." It should be
noted that if the victim's reputation for violence can be established,
it may create a presumption that the defendant was aware of the
victim's character.
5 3
Whether the defendant has introduced evidence of the victim's
character for proving that the victim was the aggressor or for showing
his own fear and apprehension, the prosecution is entitled to rebuttal
As in most situations where character evidence is admissible, reputa-
tion testimony is the sole means of proving the victim's character. How-
ever, where the issue is the defendant's fear and apprehension in the
face of an attack, the defendant should not be prohibited from intro-
ducing proof of particular acts known to him at the time of the
incident.5 4
B. Character of Prosecutrix in a Rape Case
Character evidence is admissible if relevant to the issue of consent
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
prosecution, over the objection of the defendant, was allowed to introduce evidence
of the deceased's good moral character by showing that he was a church member.
On appeal, the Court held that the evidence was improper since the accused was
not charged "with the slaying of a saint." Id. at 56.48 Morrison v. Commonwealth, 74 S.W. 277 (Ky. 1903).
49Parker v. Commonwealth, 28 S.W. 500 (Ky. 1894). The statement in this
case that the prosecution is prohibited from initially introducing evidence of the
deceased's character may be subject to question since the danger of unfair
prejudice is not present as it is when the accused's character is concerned.
50 Strong v. Commonwealth, 287 S.W. 235 (Ky. 1926).
5' Frie .1 Comonwealth, 255 S.W.2d 483 (Ky. 1953).
52 8 S.W.2d 415 (Ky. 1928).
53 Trabune v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W. 186 (Ky. 1891).
54 Contra, Blackburn v. Commonwealth, 234 S.W.2d 178 (Ky. 1950).
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in a rape case.55 If the accused rapist pleads consent, the character of
the prosecutrix for morality or chastity is placed in issue.50 If she has
an established disposition for unchastity or immorality, it is considered
more probable that she consented to the act for which the defendant
is charged. If the defendant denies the act, evidence of the prosecu-
trix's character is immaterial.
In addition to reputation testimony, the defendant is also allowed
to introduce proof of particular acts of unchastity and immorality.57
The reason particular acts are admissible in this instance was stated
by the Court in Grigsby v. Commonwealth:58
But we hold that evidence of particular acts of immorality with
other men occuring shortly before the alleged rape is competent
upon the idea that if she made merchandise of her virtue, that fact
will strongly militate against the probability that she did not con-
sent in the case at hand.
Similarly, the accused's prior voluntary sexual relations with the
prosecutrix are admissible,59 but acts subsequent to the alleged offense
are inadmissible.60
After the defendant has injected the issue of the prosecutrix's
character for morality or chastity, rebuttal evidence by the prosecution
is admissible. Although some jurisdictions hold that the character of
the prosecutrix is not subject to proof by the prosecution until it has
been attacked by the defendant, the better rule is to allow the
prosecution to introduce such evidence once the accused interposes
the plea of consent.61
VI. CHA CrEA EvmEN CE To IMPEAcH A WrrN ss
Character evidence is most frequently used to impeach a witness.
Section 597 of the Kentucky Civil Code of Practice provided that a
witness could be impeached by the party against whom he was
55 Although character evidence is admissible in other types of sex crimes
where consent is recognized as a defense, the discussion here is limited to the
offense of rape.56Rooney v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.2d 71 (Y. 1946); Lake v. Common-
wealth, 104 S.W. 1003 (Ky. 1907).5 7 Holland v. Commonwealth, 272 S.W.2d 458 (Ky. 1954).
58 187 S.W.2d 259, 263 (Ky. 1945). It should be noted that the defendants
evidence in this case was held too remote to have a bearing on the issue of con-
sent.59 Bowman v. Commonwealth, 143 S.W. 47 (Ky. 1912).
60 Holland v. Commonwealth, 272 S.W.2d 458 (Ky. 1954).
61 In Lake v. Commonwealth, 104 S.W. 1003 (Ky. 1907), the prosecution
initially introduced evidence of the prosecutrix's good reputation for virtue. The
Court recognized the general rule that in rape cases the reputation of the prosecutrix
is always competent evidence where consent is an issue; however, the case does
not directly hold that the prosecution may initially introduce evidence of the
prosecutrix s reputation.
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produced by evidence of the witness's reputation for untruthfulness
and immorality or by proof that he had been convicted of a felony.
Particular wrongful acts, other than a felony conviction, were not
admissible to impeach under the Civil Code. Rule 48.07 of the Ken-
tucky Rules of Civil Procedure [The Civil Rules are hereinafter
cited as KRCP], which superseded section 597 of the Civil Code
of Practice, omits impeachment by proof of reputation for im-
morality and permits any party to impeach a witness without re-
gard to who called him, but in all other respects section 597 of the
Code and KRCP 43.07 are the same.62 Under Rule 13.04 of the Ken-
tucky Rules of Criminal Procedure, KRCP 43.07 is applicable to
criminal proceedings.63
Although both the Civil Code and the Civil Rules provide that
evidence of particular acts, other than felony convictions, is inadmis-
sible for impeachment purposes, questions concerning impeachment
by particular wrongful acts often arise and are the subject of comment
in appellate decisions. In a recent case,64 the prosecution sought to
impeach a defendant by showing on cross-examination that he had
previously been charged with intoxication and other misdemeanors.
On appeal this evidence was held inadmissible. Similarly, it has been
held improper to ask a witness whether he has been indicted for
perjury 65 or whether she has given birth to an illegitimate child.66
It is not always clear whether questions concerning particular
wrongful acts are intended to impeach the witness or to smear his
character. However, where the witness makes a statement on direct
examination, counsel is allowed to cross-examine him about what he
said, even though in so doing particular wrongful acts of the witness
are shown. In Birchman v. Commonwealth,67 the defendant testified
on direct that his gun battle with the police was the first time he had
engaged in such activity. Over defendant's objection the prosecution
was permitted to ask whether he had been involved in a similar inci-
62KY. R. Civ. P. 43.07 [hereinafter cited as KRCP] provides: A witness
may be impeached by any party, without regard to which party produced
him, by contradictory evidence, by showing that he had made statements
different from his present testimony, or by evidence that his general
reputation for untruthfulness renders him unworthy of belief; but not by
evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the
examination of a witness, or record of a judgment, that he has been
convicted of a felony.
63KY. R. CBimvi. P. 13.04 provides that "[rules of Civil Procedure heretofore
applicable to criminal procedure by virtue of KRS 447.155 shall continue to be
applicable to the extent not superseded by these rules."64 Terry v. Commonwealth 471 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1971).
65 Johnson v. Commonwealth, 61 S.W. 1005 (Ky. 1901).66Hutsell v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.2d 898 (Ky. 1951).
67 238 S.W.2d 1008 (Ky. 1951).
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dent with police officers in Toledo, Ohio. The Court of Appeals held
that the question was proper to contradict the statement made by the
witness on direct examination. However, the cross examiner is pro-
hibited from introducing evidence to contradict a statement made on
direct examination if the statement relates to a collateral matter. 8
A. Impeachment By Evidence Of A Felony Conviction
Impeaching a witness by introducing evidence of a prior felony
conviction is an exception to the rule forbidding impeachment on the
basis of particular wrongful acts. This exception is based on the
rationale that a felon has been proven guilty of conduct indicating a
deterioration of character of such magnitude as to render him unworthy
of belief in a court of law.69
In Kentucky, a felony conviction can be used for impeachment only
after the judgment becomes final. An appeal suspends the judgment,
and therefore prohibits introduction of the conviction until it is
affirmed.70 A motion for a new trial also suspends the judgment and
prohibits the use of a conviction for impeachment until the motion is
denied.71 Since a juvenile delinquency proceeding results in adjudica-
tion of a status rather than conviction for a crime, it does not come
within the rule allowing impeachment by felony convictions. 2
Assuming a felony conviction justifies the inference that a
person is untruthful,73 to have probative value it must not be too re-
6sKeene v. Commonwealth, 210 S.W.2d 926 (Ky. 1948). The defendant-
witness testified that he had never assaulted or raped the prosecutrix or any other
person. The prosecution was thereafter permitted to offer rebuttal testimony by
one who had allegedly been assaulted. The Court of Appeals held this type of
impeachment to be improper. As to what is considered a collateral issue, see Com-
monwealth v. Jackson, 281 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Ky. 1955), where the Court analyzed
this problem and cited Wigmore's test of collateralness: "Could the fact, as to
which the prior self-contradiction is predicated, have been shown in evidence for
any purpose independently of the self contradiction."
69 3 WGo xox, supra note 3, §§ 519, 986, 987. It should be noted that Ky.
REv. STAT. § 421.090 (1972) [hereinafter cited as KRS] disqualifies any person
convicted of the offenses specified in KRS §§ 432.160-.180 (perjury and related
offenses) from testifying in any judicial proceeding except where a person so con-
victed wishes to testify in his own behalf in a criminal trial. However a conviction
of perjury in another state was held not sufficient to disqualify a witness. Wood v.
Wood, 264 S.W.2d 260 (Ky. 1954). It could nevertheless be used to impeach
the witness.7 0 Foure v. Commonwealth 283 S.W. 958 (Ky. 1926). PROPOSED FEDERAL
RuLEs OF EVIDENCE rule 609(e) takes the opposite position and permits the use
of a conviction despite a pending a ppeal; however, evidence that the conviction
has been appealed is admissible in rebuttal.
71 Adkins v. Commonwealth, 309 S.W.2d 165 (Ky. 1958).
72 Coleman v. Staples, 446 S.W.2d 557 (Ky. 1967). Accord, PROPOSED FED-
ERAL RuLEs OF EVIDENCE rule 609(d).
73 See Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 365 S.W.2d 853, 855 (Ky. 1963), where
Justice Moremen Speaking for the court, said: "The writer has never been con-
vinced that a feion is a periuror-but we have accepted that premise and the
conception is embodied in our law."
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mote74 and must be directed to the time when the witness testifies.75
However, a fifteen year old conviction has been held not too remote
to be introduced for impeachment.76
Although some jurisdictions hold that a conviction cannot be
introduced for impeachment if the sentence is never served, Kentucky
follows the view that conviction alone is sufficient. Since the purpose
of KRCP 43.07 is to apprise the court and jury that a witness may
be unworthy of belief, the rule is not concerned with the penalty
imposed.77
KRCP 43.07 permits a party to impeach any witness;78 there-
fore, a defendant in a criminal trial is subject to impeachment if he
testifies. Ordinarily, the rules of evidence prohibit the prosecution
from introducing evidence of the defendant's character; however,
when the defendant testifies, he places his character for truthfulness
and veracity in issue. This situation creates some of the most confusing
and troublesome problems concerning the use of character evidence,
and has been the source of much comment and criticism.
When the defendant-witness is impeached, problems arise con-
cerning the jury's application of the impeachment evidence. Where
a felony conviction is used to impeach, will the jury regard it as
tending to prove the offense charged, or will they consider it only as it
affects the defendant's credibility as a witness? The court instructs
them to do the latter, but whether this is actually accomplished is
subject to question.
79
The rules governing impeachment of the defendant have until
recently been identical to those involving the ordinary witness. For
example, it was previously permissible to impeach a defendant charged
with detaining a female against her will with intent to have carnal
knowledge by introducing a prior conviction for rape.80 Two questions
74 Cotton v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.2d 698 (Ky. 1970).
75 Goehring v. Commonwealth, 370 S.W.2d 822 (Ky. 1965). The latter
bule should be distinguished from the rule governing the admissibility of character
evidence to prove an act, which is required to be directed to the time the act
allegedly occurred.76 Bogie v. Commonwealth, 467 S.W.2d 767 (Ky. 1971).7 7 Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 365 S.W.2d 853 (Ky. 1963).
78In Spencer v. Commonwealth, 203 S.W.2d 30 (Ky. 1947), the Court
indicated that an absent witness whose probable testimony was read to the jury
could be impeached the same as any other witness.7 9 Ideally, it is hoped that jurors will perform the mental gymnastics required
by such instructions. However, many doubt whether this is realistic. The follow-
ing assertion of Justice Jackson in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453
(1949), is indicative of the criticism leveled at the effectiveness of limiting in-
structions: "The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by
instructions to the jury... all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction."
80 White v. Commonwealth, 228 S.W.2d 426 (Ky. 1950). The use of rape
(Continued on next page)
[VOL 61
CAAcrim EvmiENc
are raised by this situation. Is a conviction for rape relevant to the
issue of truth and veracity? Will knowledge that the defendant has
previously been convicted of an offense similar to the one for which
he is being tried create jury prejudice towards the defendant? Im-
peachment of a witness by proof of felony convictions is now con-
trolled by the decisions of the Court of Appeals in Cowan v. Common-
wealth81 and Cotton v. Commonwealth, 2 which eliminated some of
the glaring flaws in the impeachment process by confining impeach-
ment evidence to the purpose for which it is offered.
In Cowan, Justice Palmore pointed out the dangers inherent in
impeachment by felony convictions. The prosecution cross-examined
the defendant about his felony convictions in sufficient detail to cover
four pages of the trial transcript, even though the convictions had
already been introduced into evidence. The jury was then ad-
monished to consider this evidence only as it affected the defendant's
credibility as a witness. The Court of Appeals conceded that it is
unlikely that an admonition could eliminate the prejudicial effect
created by the disclosure of felony convictions considering the great
latitude granted the prosecution in the conduct of the cross examina-
tion. The Court felt that the extensive questioning concerning the prior
convictions was a factor in the jury's verdict of involuntary man-
slaughter. Thereafter, the Court held that if a witness is asked whether
he has been convicted of a felony and he answers affirmatively further
inquiry is impermissible. On the other hand, if the witness denies
having been convicted of a felony, refutation by proof of his record
should be limited to one conviction. Thus, Cowan was intended to
remove the opportunity to dwell on the details of prior crimes.
In Cotton, the Court modified Cowan by holding that impeachment
by proof of felony convictions must be confined to felonies involving
dishonesty, stealing, or false swearing. The Court explained that such
felonies included, but were not limited to: perjury, subornation of
perjury, obtaining money under false pretenses, forgery, embezzlement,
counterfeiting, fraudulent alterations, misappropriation of funds, false
impersonation, passing checks without sufficient funds or on non-
existing banks, fraudulent concealment, making false entries, and all
felonies involving theft or stealing. Cotton focused particular attention
on impeachment of a defendant-witness. The Court held that a hearing
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
convictions to impeach was upheld on appeal. However, under Cotton v. Com-
monwealth, 454 S.W.2d 698 (Ky. 1970), a conviction of that kind was sub-
sequently declared inadmissable for impeachment purposes.81407 S.W.2d 697 (Ky. 1966).
82 454 S.W.2d 698 (Ky. 1970).
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outside the presence of the jury is required where the trial judge will
determine the admissibility of a felony conviction offered for impeach-
ment. If, in the opinion of the trial judge, the conviction is not relevant
to the issue of credibility, is too remote, or is likely to create prejudice
outweighing its probative value, it shall be excluded.
The holding in Cotton retreated somewhat from the dictates of
Cowan regarding the number of convictions which are admissible.
Under Cotton, the number of convictions which may be introduced is
left to the discretion of the trial judge. Further, the specific nature of
the offense can be shown.8 3 The rule in Cotton represents an enlight-
ened position on this aspect of the law of evidence, far superior to that
adopted by the drafters of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence.84
Harris v. Commonwealth 5 applies the rule announced in Cotton.
In Harris, wherein the defendant was charged with a sex related of-
fense, the prosecution was permitted to impeach the defendant-
witness by introducing a prior conviction for rape. Reversing the con-
viction, the Court of Appeals stated: 'We do not consider the offense
of rape to be relevant to the issue of credibility....8,s6
B. Impeachment by Evidence of Reputation for Truth and Veracity
Character evidence may also be used to impeach a witness's reputa-
tion for truth and veracity. The rules discussed relative to the use of
character evidence to prove an act are applicable here; however, the
testimony must be confined to the witness's reputation for truth and
veracity. Evidence of a witness's reputation for general moral char-
acter is no longer admissible to impeach or support his credibility.8 7
Further, the defendant-witness's reputation for honesty and integrity
is admissible only as it affects his credibility.88
Testimony of a witness's reputation for truth and veracity must be
directed to the time when the witness testifies; otherwise it is irrelevant.
The testimony may be based on the community's general estimate of
83 Since Cotton held that only convictions relevant to truth and veracity
could be used to impeach, it is logical that the specific nature of the conviction
should be shown.
8 4 
PoPosED FEDERAL RuLzs OF EvmENcE rule 609(e) permits impeachment
by proof of any conviction punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one
year, or by a conviction of a crime involving dishonesty or false statement regardless
of unishment. However, if the court determines that the probative value of the
eviaence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, the evidence
may be excluded.
85 469 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1971).
86 Id. at 70.
87As stated previously, KRCP 43.07 omitted the provision of Civil Code § 597
allowing impeachment on the basis of reputation for immorality.
Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 200 S.W.2d 459 (Ky. 1947).
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the witness or it may be based on "negative character" evidence.89
As in other instances, opinion evidence is inadmissible."
C. Admonitions to Limit the Effect of the Evidence
Since it is recognized that impeachment evidence, particularly proof
of felony convictions, can be prejudicial and misunderstood, courts seek
to minimize these dangers by admonishing the jury of its proper pur-
pose. The admonition commonly takes the following form:
The jury will consider the evidence of the defendant that he has
been convicted of a felony only insofar as it may affect his credi-
bility as a witness, if it does so, and for no other purpose. It neither
disproves his guilt or innocence on this charge.91
The trial court is under no duty to admonish the jury regarding
the purpose of impeachment evidence.92 Although it has not always
been so in this jurisdiction, it is now crucial that the defendant request
an admonition. If he fails to do so, he is deemed to have waived his
right to have it considered on appeal.93 This rule is based on the dis-
tinction between an admonition and an instruction. Under both the
Civil Code and the Civil Rules, the court instructs on the whole law of
the case.94 In Taylor v. Commonwealth,95 the defendant-witness was
impeached by evidence of a felony conviction; however, he failed to
request an admonition. On appeal, the Court stated:
It seems plain that the accused may not play fast and loose with
the court by failing to request an admonition and then assigning
the failure to give such an admonition as reversible error.96
The defendant is entitled to an admonition, if requested, only when
he has been impeached. If a witness other than the defendant has
been impeached, the rationale for requiring an admonition does not
exist.97 However, where the defendant's character witness has been
cross-examined as to whether he has heard of particular acts of mis-
conduct by the defendant, it is proper for the defendant to request an
admonition that the evidence is admissible only as it affects the wit-
ness's credibility and not to show the probability of the defendant's
guilt on the present charge.98
89 Davenport v. Commonwealth, 148 S.W.2d 1054 (Ky. 1941).90 Borders v. Commonwealth, 67 S.W.2d 960 (Ky. 1934).
91 Meek v. Commonwealth, 11 S.W.2d 996 (Ky. 1928).92 Clair v. Commonwealth, 102 S.W.2d 367 (Ky. 1937).
93 Id.
94 Ochsner v. Commonwealth, 109 S.W. 326 (Ky. 1908).
95 432 S.W.2d 805 (Ky. 1968).
96 Id. at 808.
97 Clark v. Commonwealth, 257 S.W. 1035 (Ky. 1924).98 Wright v. Commonwealth, 102 S.W.2d 376 (Ky. 1937).
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D. Overview of the Impeachment Process
What has previously been said concerning the admissibility of
opinion evidence to prove one's character in other situations may also
be applied to proof of a witness's character for truth and veracity.
Unfortunately, such evidence may well be a more reliable basis for
ascertaining credibility than either reputation evidence or proof of
felony convictions.
Impeachment by proof of felony convictions is responsible for a
substantial part of the criticism aimed at the impeachment process.
Since truthfulness is a complex psychological phenomenon, it is ques-
tionable whether a single act which results in a felony conviction is
indicative of a witness's disposition to be truthful when testifying. As
one commentator has pointed out, the present use of felony convictions
to impeach is contrary to scientific method.99 Yet, here as in other
areas of the law, once a rule is established it is difficult to dislodge.
Cotton v. Commonwealth'00 was decided in 1970. Before then,
Kentucky law governing impeachment was irrational and subject to
abuse. Since Cotton only those convictions relevant to credibility can
be employed in the impeachment process. The Court further pro-
hibited impeachment by any conviction which the trial judge deems
unduly prejudicial. Cotton was long overdue and a welcomed change.
If one accepts the premise on which impeachment by felony convic-
tions is based, Cotton represents the best answer to a difficult problem.
VII. CRoss-ExAmiA~ioN OF CaAcra WhEssEs
Whether a character witness has testified for the purpose of im-
peachment or to show one's disposition to commit an act, he can be
cross-examined as to whether he has heard of particular acts of mis-
conduct committed by the person about whom he has testified.101
However, the witness cannot be asked if he knows of particular wrong-
ful acts. 02 The particular acts inquired of must be relevant to the
trait of character in issue. For instance, it has been held improper to
cross-examine a character witness who testified to the accused's good
moral character as to whether he had heard of the accused's being
publicly drunk or whether he had a reputation as a common drunk-
ard. 03
99 Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current Trends, supra note 45.
-00 454 S.W.2d 698 (Ky. 1970).
-01 Wright v. Commonwealth. 102 S.W. 376 (Ky. 1902).
1
0 2 Fox v. Commonwealth, 1 S.W. 396 (Ky. 1886).
10 3 Daws v. Commonwealth, 234 S.W.2d 953 (Ky. 1950).
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Although the cross-examiner is bound by the witness's answer, 04
there is considerable criticism of the rule allowing particular acts to be
mentioned on cross-examination. The fact that the question is asked
often causes unfavorable inferences regardless of the answer given
by the witness. However, if it can be shown that the question was
asked in bad faith, it may be ground for reversal.10 5
CONCLUSION
The major objection to the use of character evidence is its propensity
to be misused. This is not to say that it is purposely misused, but to
suggest that a lay jury often finds it difficult to separate evidence which
is admissible for one purpose but not another. Although no one can
analyze precisely the mental process of a juror considering evidence,
the use of character evidence involves inherent dangers of unfair
prejudice in some instances.
A fundamental rule of evidence, often disregarded, dictates that
evidence should be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the
possibility of prejudice. The mechanical application of arbitrary rules,
rationalized by often unjustified reliance on precedent, can result in
ignoring the reasoning process essential to the sound application of
the law of evidence. Although the law has chosen to draw its con-
clusions in the area of character evidence without regard to the sci-
entific validity of the premises on which the conclusions are based, a
proper consideration of the policies underlying the law of evidence
will remedy many of the problems in this area.
Merle C. Clark
104 Keene v. Commonwealth, 210 S.W.2d 926 (Ky. 1948).
105 Steele v. Commonwealth, 232 S.W. 646 (Ky. 1921).
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